All the missed opportunities at West Baltimore MARC

The antiquated commuter rail station at West Baltimore high above the two legs of US 40 where it transforms from the "Highway to nowhere" back to a normal urban thoroughfare has long been recognized for having lots of potential.

West Baltimore MARC station east side (Photo: Philipsen)

Over the years many projects came and went on account of the pivotal importance of this station with its commuter rail connection to the airport and DC. Many projects, small and large, were initiated on account of parking, economic development, equity, transit oriented development and intermodal connectivity. The projects mostly initiated by MTA go back decades. Aside from lighting, shelters, landscaping  and step repairs, the more notable initiatives involved the demolition of ramps, bridges and retaining walls at the abrupt western end of the freeway in favor of tripling the capacity of parking and finally the construction of a bus hub in which a number of bus lines converge and lay over on what was the parking lot closest to the rail station. A developer who had bought the historic ice house facility in hopes of a windfall when the original Red Line was planned eventually gave up after the Red line was killed after 13 years of planning in 2015. He never published a vision for the ice house property. 

Governor Moore announcing the revival of the Red
Line with the historic Ice House ruin as a
backdrop (Photo: Philipsen)

The incremental approach did not result in a convincing solution. Passengers can still board trains only on two doors via step stools on account of platforms that are ultra low, because the curve doesn't allow high platforms without forming a large gap. The shelters are still no better than bus stops and the many rickety steps leave anyone not entirely mobile stranded at the lower level. 

The parking lots and buses are on the east side of the elevated tracks but the southbound trains to the BWI airport job center and to Washington's Union Station require access from the west side. This means folks have to squeeze alongside three lanes of traffic through the dark underpass on a narrow sidewalk. 

What is infuriating, though, is that not even the multi-billion dollar Amtrak tunnel, the federal "Reconnecting Communities" grant supposed to address the ill fated highway and the planning for the  Red Line light rail line, all converging right here did not yield a truly comprehensive design that optimally addresses economic development, transit oriented development, the Red Line and convenient fully accessible intermodal connectivity. 

What Amtrak revealed as the new design last week leaves so much to be desired that calling it fatally flawed would barely be an overstatement.

Amtrak rendering showing the new station with its two head houses
(Amtrak)

True, multi billion dollar projects that take 10 years or more to plan and build don't necessarily yield creativity, innovation, or even a comprehensive approach. Federal laws such as the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) and the associated reviews and steps of the Environmental Impacts Statements (EIS) put projects into a sequential straight-jacket. The driver for the process is the original "purpose and need" determination. In the case of the new Amtrak tunnel, it is all about the high speed north-east corridor (NEC) in which the measly MARC train station is just a speck on the map, no matter that the slightly revised track alignment wipe out the current station entirely and open up all a full opportunity for an optimal intermodal station that is fully incorporated into the community. 

Alas, that opportunity wasn’t seized. Even though actual construction on this end of the tunnel is years out, the local transit agency MTA who is in charge of the MARC station design and operation claims that it is too late to change anything. By releasing some renderings this week Amtrak and MTA  were probably hoping that folks would be blinded the new headhouses with waiting rooms that are, indeed, a vast improvement over what is there today.

Close up view of the new station seen from the bus hub (Amtrak)

The complaint about the suggested solution centers around the completely baffling fact that the new design still assumes two underpasses, still has a solid earth berm between them and still requires riders to use the automobile underpass to get to the other side. In fact, Amtrak's own renderings perfectly illustrate how horrible this connection will be. 

Maybe even worse, the solid center berm also prevents the Red Line from passing through under the center of the MARC station. Instead, just as the pedestrian the light rail, too has to use the underpasses utilizing the third traffic lane on each side. Possibly the worst aspect: The Red Line plans don't anticipate a modification of the bus hub and locate the Red Line platforms a full block to the east of the MARC station. as a result there isn't real intermodal connectivity with minimized transfer distances where all modes operate within an easy to control safe, and well-lit weather protected envelope. Instead parking, bus stops and light rail stations are scattered around like spilled milk, requiring riders to traverse on routes that are open to the elements, next to fast moving traffic and not easy to or obvious to find. The proposed idea of building back a berm a dozen feet west of where the current one sits is not only exceedingly uncreative and counterproductive, it is most likely even costlier than an open bridge span. 

Overall station area TOD plan developed with the community
(ArchPlan)

The surrounding communities convened for years during the original Red Line planning phase working out a "station area plan" that was formally adopted by the City. It  showed significant TOD on the surface parking lots and on a half mile stretch of currently underutilized land connecting to an extraordinary urban green space known as the Gwynns Falls Valley. 

In the community plan the Ice House was imagined as a repurposed amenity with structured commuter parking in the back and residential use on top. The public school property and some underutilized industrial structures to the south were also envisioned as redeveloped high density mixed use. The space where the bus hub is now located was shown as a station plaza acting as a neighborhood square where the community could convene and where markets and events could be held. All in all, the community hoped for a comprehensive new "village center"  that would tie together the neighborhoods which are currently separated by tracks and traffic. 

The suggested headhouse even if plopped down along the earthen berm, will not prevent all of these future possibilities, but  it will make it harder because the fundamental east-west separation will remain.  Instead of a people plaza residents and commuters will simply continue to see the uninspired bus hub not suitable for gatherings. 

Early station sketch with light rail going through the center of
the MARC area (ArchPlan 2001)

Two Red line tracks and platforms side by side directly under the MARC station would be vastly better than separated tracks squeezing through those underpasses. To count for the possibility of failing elevators the renderings show a ridiculously long ramp next to the ice house which no wheelchair user would ever embark on but which is an open invitation for skateboards, scooters and the like.

My firm ArchPlan looked at improvements of the West Baltimore MARC station as early as 2001 after Mayor O'Malley had designated West Baltimore as a "Great Gateway". Even then a light rail line west was part of the Long Range Transportation Plan of the Baltimore Metropolitan Council. When the original Red Line was officially planned form 2002 to 2015 there was no Amtrak project and running LRT through the center was deemed too expensive. Now with the Amtrak tracks in a new alignment thanks to the funded B&P tunnel rebuild, a bridge would likely be cheaper than the earthen backfill and would open a plethora of design opportunities. But MTA clings to their mundane bus hub which was part of the consolation price after the killing of the Red Line. This is now the sacred cow around which the much more important parts revolve. 

Many architects and planners agree that the proposed new station is truly a lost opportunity; unless somebody comes to their senses in the next few months and revises the design. There is certainly plenty of time to do it, even if it would mean a minor amendment to the EIS. 

Klaus Philipsen, FAIA

The author worked on numerous West Baltimore station enhancement projects, on the Red Line and on the West Baltimore Station Advisory Committees. The date of the initial involvement was initially stated as 2007 and was changed to 2001. 

The sad proposed way how transit riders and trains have to squeeze though a tunnel (Amtrak)

Current stairs from the arrival platform to the bus hub and parking areas (Photo: Philipsen)

Boarding via step stool and 2 doors (Photo: Philipsen)

The New Key Bridge - More Questions than Answers

 Three months after the catastrophic collapse of the Baltimore Francis Scott Key Bridge with the clean-up of the shipping channel completed in an extraordinary effort "under unified command" at a cost of about $150 million, the only certain thing is that the old bridge is gone. It is uncertain how the new bridge will look, how tall it will be, how far it will span, how many lanes it will have and who will pay for it.  That is a lot of uncertainty, some on account of all the chaos in Washington and some on account of a process called  “progressive design-build” (PBD).

The Francis Scott Key Bridge, a landmark and a gateway 
to Baltimore, 1.6 mile long, longest span 1,200'
(Photo: A. Perna/SUN) 

The matter of the new bridge has been thrusted into the hands of Maryland Transportation Authority (MDTA), the agency in charge of Maryland's toll roads and toll facilities. Part of the Maryland Department of Transportation and created in 1971, these folks have built big stuff before, the Inter-County Connector (ICC), the MD 95 toll lanes north of the Harbor tunnel and the giant interchange with I-95. They were in charge of the construction of the Fort McHenry tunnel (1985) and oversaw the completion of the second span of the Bay Bridge (1973). Recently they completed the Middleton Nice bridge. A current MDTA investigation is the construction of a third Bay bridge.

But all of those projects had been on the books for decades, were thoroughly planned, designed and eventually included in the capital transportation investment plans. Some projects, such as the ICC were highly controversial and used innovative funding (GARVI bonds) and construction methods (Design-Build). Nothing compares to a project that originated overnight, has no firm funding and is estimated to cost $2.7 bn and to be completed in just 4 years.

Slide from the Industry Day: Very few specifics

Nevertheless, the MDTA went to work and put out a request for proposals (RFP) at the end of May. Responders had to be quick, the deadline for a response was June 24. The selected bidder is scheduled to be announced in July. 

The general set-up of "progressive design build"
(MDTA Slide from Industry Day)

The 54 page RFP  with a 139 page appendix is very cursory and leaves almost everything open for the two-step "progressive" approach in which a design framework is jointly created between MDTA and the successful bidder, followed by construction by the same team if the price is right. 

0. The process involves a single contract that unites MDTA with the selected PDB team, which includes contractor and designer roles. This procurement will select a qualified team for initial services to develop the project scope and requirements in collaboration with MDTA and project stakeholders. Upon successful completion of Phase 1, the PDB entity will have exclusive negotiating rights for Phase 2, which includes project final design/engineering and construction. In the event a guaranteed maximum price is not agreed upon, the MDTA will deliver the work under a separate contracting mechanism. (MDTA press release)

It is the point of "progressive design-build" to save time by working out the design between owner, designer and contractor. This aims to avoid the possibility that a design created by MDTA would take months or years to prepare only to be revised if the construction cost would come in too high at the time of bid. However, without any design and without funding it is hard to know what is "too high", even if a cost framework has been established. 

It isn't obvious, why the MDTA wouldn't at least stipulate a few design parameters as a given, even within the progressive design-build approach. During the "industry day" that preceded the RFP 1700 people registered indicating massive interest very little information was given about what would drive the redesign.  An unsolicited proposal from before the RFP submitted to MDOT soon after the collapse could have provided ideas and insights. The proposal, as reported, included higher vertical clearance and a much wider span across the shipping channel that would place the pylons in shallow waters outside the reach of big ships and thus avoiding the need for costly “dolphins” to protect them.

Corpus Christi, TX Harbor Bridge before (Truss bridge) and after
(Cable stayed): Higher and wider (205' clear ht)

Clarifying design principles in some kind of performance specification would put all bidders on equal footing, literally and figuratively, a goal of any typical request for proposals, popularly known as comparing apples to apples. 

Questions abound: 

• Should the new bridge should sit in the exact same vertical and horizontal alignment as the old one or whether it should wider and higher? The port indicated that a higher bridge is needed.
• MDTA received a determination from the federal government that they would grant the project a "categorical exclusion" (CE) which eliminates the time consuming preparation of a full environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under NEPA. At which point would modifications in width, height and spans challenge the assumption that a new bridge would not create additional environmental impacts? 
• Closely related to the question of design metrics is the question whether the concrete approach parts of the bridge could remain or must be demolished. Those ramps over water still stand and were not impacted by the collision and collapse. The RFP states that it is assumed that they would be demolished but doesn't explain why such a costly and time consuming assumption is made nor is it made entirely clear who would be responsible for that demolition and whether such demolition would still fall under a CE.  
• What are the required minimum protective measures for the supports?
• Is the projected project cost of $2.7bn realistic and what is it based on?
• Why would we settle for 4.5 years to completion? The projected time of Oct 2028 wouldn't be a speed record in bridge reconstruction after a collapse. Minnesota did it faster and spectacularly also Italy. There a big bridge in Genoa was redesigned and completed in 18 months involving local architect  Renzo Piano for attractive design. (The RFP allows for faster completion, of course and promises incentives to do so).

The collapse of the Key Bridge was a traumatic event that in an instant not only blocked one of the nation's busiest ports, but also eliminated a local landmark and severed a vital regional traffic artery that is urgently needed for truck traffic, commuting and a complete freeway network. The trauma shouldn't be followed by the drama of delays and cost overruns as in the case of the Corpus Christi Harbor Bridge or the Gordie Howe International Bridge towards Canada. The latter was scheduled to open this year but is delayed and has recently been estimated for a final cost of $4.7bn US dollars.

Cable stayed bridges: Gordie Howe International Bridge, MI (2024),
1.5 miles long, 138' clearance, delayed completion, cost $4.7 bn

Little of Governor Moore's word power, which he frequently and effectively used during the clean-up efforts under the "Unified Command",  has been used to speak about the new bridge design or set the framework for this extraordinary task. 

It was frequently mentioned how much the Key Bridge meant for Marylanders or Baltimoreans and how its sudden loss has carved a deep scar in the minds and hearts of many. What does this trauma mean for the rebuild process and the design one should expect for the replacement bridge?

Such  non-technical notions do not come easy to the bureaucrats and engineers who usually manage RFPs but they should set the stage for a task that is like none before.

The new bridge needs not only to be built extraordinarily fast, it has to be of such an excellent design that is it can become a recognizable and authentic landmark again. The new bridge needs to respond to rising sea levels, larger ships and increasing demands for alternative transportation modes such as transit, bikes and pedestrians that have previously not been accommodated on the bridge. 

The public can only hope that communication about what will happen next and how the MDTA will select the winning partner, and how it will establish metrics for design will be ramped up in the coming weeks. It can be expected that there are lots of interests that want to have say in this. Already there has been discussion whether a new bridge should have more vertical clearance than the 185' feet the old bridge had. The public deserves nothing less than participation and full transparency, no matter that everything has to happen fast. 

Klaus Philipsen, FAIA