Baltimore's Transit Trap: Making the Same Mistake Over and Over

Here is a message for MTA's new transit administrator: Do not repeat past mistakes. 

It isn't news to anybody that very few people have a high opinion about Baltimore's transit, even though the system has a lot of stuff on the ground, including three rail modes and a large bus fleet.  MTA's two most recent Administrators couldn't help that poor image either, in spite of being young professional planners highly apt in the use of social media and coming from outside the usual pipeline of inside engineers or political appointees. 

Baltimore Transit: still a grade D on the annual report card.

So what are the real reasons for MTA's underperformance in terms of reliability and public perception? There are many, but I will focus on one most obvious to me, namely that the MTA has been building its system around what was easy to do and not what was needed: Political and physical convenience, trumped desirable outcomes. And we are about to do this again. Let me explain:

The original Metro line had a grand vision for a full system comparable to DC and San Francisco, two earlier examples for President Johnson's Great society public transit ambitions for America. But Baltimore was late in the game when both, ambition and funds had waned. As a result,  it got only half of  Atlanta's two line sister-system: One single line with later small extensions not connecting to a major feeder such as the airport in Atlanta's case. 

Baltimore Rail plan 2000

When Baltimore's ambitious Mayor Don Schaefer wanted more transit, it had to happen fast and in tandem with his plans for Oriole Park. So, instead of building more Metro and waiting for federal funds, he ordered a cheaper surface light rail line built largely on existing rail right-of-way. It was quick and cheap, but it also was a different technology that wasn't compatible with metro. Plus one one was surface and the other in a tunnel. So they didn't share a station. The two lines operated not as a system but "in loose formation" as former MDOT Secretary Porcari observed. It became a matter of public derision that Metro and LRT never truly connected or intersected at Lexington Market, even though the two systems were only a block apart. This is no small matter: Transits relies on connectivity and synergy, the services don't succeed individually but in concert and as a system.

When it was unavoidable to think about additional rail transit in Baltimore, then Mayor and Governor O'Malley and Secretary Porcari knew that a urgently needed new east-west line had to truly connect with the LRT and the Metro. That wasn't easy though, because LRT, even in a tunnel, isn't compatible with Metro. So the Red Line station at Charles Center was once again designed to be a block away from the Metro Station, but with both being underground, they were to be connected via a pedestrian tunnel. (The surface LRT station at Center Street would also a block away). But O'Malley didn't push as hard for his new line as "do-it-now" Schaefer had done for his and let the design process slide beyond his time in office. As a result the incoming Governor Hogan 

 Gov Hogan 2015: "the Red Line won't be built"
(Screenshot from the new documentary about the 
Red Line "Not in Service")

had an easy time to kill O'Malley's line as a "boondoggle" and pursue a cheaper and more convenient solution: Improvements to the existing bus transit. His heart wasn't really in it and he never allocated enough money to make the improvements stick, so the buses kept being unreliable.

Enter Governor Moore and his promise of reviving the killed "Red Line". His resuscitation, though, was built more on hope than available money. So the only funds were for some more design work and outreach in which essentially the same design as before was confirmed as most desirable or effective. Yet, the continued lack of money forces the Governor to look for convenient way out. Rumor has it that the way out also is the bus; named "BRT" or "bus-rapid-transit", a play with names (light rail being known as LRT), a system that has no chance of realizing the benefits of LRT, especially in an old city with narrow streets and without tunnel segments as -most likely- it will be proposed.

Circumstances now point to an emerging irony in which the errors of the past will not only be repeated but in a worse manner than before. All signs indicate that the Mayor's favorite developer MCB (the folks who want to redevelop HarborPlace) will get his way and the still to be announced "preferred alignment" for the dumbed down Red Line BRT will be on Pratt Street, not one, but two blocks away from the existing subway.

In short, instead of building out the existing Baltimore transit system by using LRT, Metro or even MARC (the commuter rail service), BRT will be tacked on as yet another mode, or, in the worst case, just as a glorified bus, i.e. nothing new at all. This would not only not fix anything about Baltimore's already disjointed transit system, it would make it even more disjointed.

Pratt Street between Charles and Light Streets
(Photo: Philipsen)

What should be done instead? The current MTA plans already include a plan for BMore Bus and money for the upgrade of the already operating Quicklink 40. It runs roughly on the Red Line alignment and stops near Metro. Keep it there. If the real Red Line can't be funded, why not be honest and just leave it at an upgraded Quicklink bus, call it BRT if you have to, but certainly don't run it on Pratt Street. Fund BMore Bus.

As far as rail service:  Improve intra city MARC service by adding stations on the Penn Line at Bayview and Broadway and maybe (more costly) at Penn and North. Give up on nonsense like Maglev from DC to Cherry Hill or a Tesla Hyperlink. Fix operations so that buses run on time. (The performance data dashboard shows current 73% on time performance, i.e. more than 1/4 of buses are more than 7 minutes late). 

Klaus Philipsen, FAIA  

The article has been corrected regarding the online performance dashboard